The moment of microaggression: The experience of acts of oppression, dehumanization and exploitation by Dover, Michael A.
Dover, Michael A.(2016). The Moment of Microaggression: The Experience of Acts of
Oppression, Dehumanization and Exploitation. Journal of Human Behavior in the Social
Environment 26(7-8): 575-586.
Michael A. Dover
School of Social Work, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA
m.a.dover@csuohio.edo
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6622-6091
KEYWORDS Dehumanization; exploitation; human needs; injustice; microaggressions;
moment; oppression; process recordings; self-determination theory; theory
Introduction
This article contributes to the theorization of microaggressions by identifying three sources of
social injustice: oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation (ODE). These unjust social
systems provide the social structural foundation for individual acts of microaggression. The
article illustrates this theoretical contribution by presenting a selected compendium of affective
words and phrases associated with the experience of any aspect of ODE (Dover, 2008),
interpreted here as acts of microaggression. The compendium includes a typology of words and
affective phrases generated from classroom exercises on the experience of acts of oppression,
dehumanization, and exploitation: (1) those reported as experienced at the moment of such an
act, (2) those describing short-term subsequent reactions to that experience, and (3) those
associated with evolved adaptive and maladaptive responses to the cumulative experience of
such acts. The article discusses the limitations of the approach taken and proposes further
research to better inform helping professionals, empower human service recipients, and inform
social activism that confronts the unjust social systems that produce microaggressions.
At the intersection of the individual and the social environment, people address their human
needs while interacting with each other from the standpoints of our multiple social group
memberships and social positions within cultural, organizational, and institutional environments.
Understanding human diversity requires recognizing within-group and between-group human
similarities and differences, as well as differences in our social positions. Unfortunately, these
differences are often correlated with reduced opportunities. At the intersection of the individual
and the social environment, people encounter barriers that produce systematic inequality in their
opportunities to address their human needs in their preferred manner. These barriers have their
roots in unjust social systems such as oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation.
One of those barriers is the experience of microaggression. This experience includes being
subjected to microaggression, initiating such acts, and observing such acts. Once it is recognized
that microaggressions arise from human interactions influenced not only by group-based social
oppression, but also from the experience of acts of organizationally and technologically based
dehumanization and from the microenforcement of economic exploitation, the near universality
of the experience of microaggression becomes apparent. Given our many group memberships and
social positions, even the most consistent individual and collective efforts at achieving relational
competence within diverse social environments are unlikely to eliminate the likelihood that
nearly all people experience microaggression.
Literature review
The term microaggression was coined by Chester Pierce to describe offensive acts that reinforced
racism (Pierce, 1970, cited in Pérez Huber & Solorzano, 2015a). Microaggressions can also be
understood as putdowns (Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez, & Willis, 1978, cited in Sue, 2010b);
everyday indignities (Smith, 2003); “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or
environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile,
derogatory, or negative . . . slights and insults” (Sue et al., 2007, p. 271); everyday racist slights
(Pérez Huber & Solorzano, 2015b); covert racism (Coates, 2011); visual microaggressions (Pérez
Huber & Solorzano, 2015b); brief, often subtle acts that convey derogatory messages
(Forrest-Bank, Jenson, & Trecartin, 2015); “small, specific, every day experiences of perceived
discrimination” (Forrest-Bank & Jenson, 2015, p. 66); or a “toxic raindrop over time on its
victim’s well-being” (Suárez-Orozco et al., 2015, p. 157).
Microaggressions were seen as taking three forms: microassaults, microinsults, and microinvali-
dation (Sue et al., 2007), with microassaults subsequently defined as macroaggressions,
involving blatant and egregious acts (Donovan et al., 2013). The causal path was from
institutional racism and the ideology of white supremacy to therapist behavior (Sue, 2010a).
These forms of microaggression have also been traced to other forms of group-based oppression,
including three types of heterosexism: blatant victimization, interpersonal microaggressions, and
environmental microaggressions (Woodford et al., 2014). Gender identity microaggressions have
been traced to transphobia (Nadal, 2013), disability-based microaggressions to ableism (Dávila,
2015; Keller & Galgay, 2010), and sexual orientation-based microaggressions to heterosexism
(Nadal, 2013) and to homophobia (McCabe, Dragowski, & Rubinson, 2013), with additional
studies of socially devalued groups collected in one volume (Sue, 2010b). One notable study
distinguished between microaggression, bullying, and hate crimes reported in research with
Jewish, Muslim, and Catholic secondary school students (Dupper, Forrest-Bank, &
Lowry-Carusillo, 2015).
Another typology of microaggressions was presented by Pérez Huber and Solorzano (2015a).
Seeking to overcome a false dichotomy between macro-interpretations and micro-interpretations
of the causes and consequences of microaggression, the authors introduced a taxonomy of
microaggressions, including (1) verbal and nonverbal assaults, often subtle, routinized or
unintentional; (2) “layered assaults,” a term that incorporates how racial microaggression
intersects with other sources of microaggression, including immigration status, accent, surname,
and phenotype; and (3) cumulative assaults, thus accounting for the experience of
microaggression over time. The authors viewed racial microaggressions as “everyday reflections
of larger racist structures and ideological beliefs” (2015a, p. 6) and saw them as rooted in social
group domination. The causal path was from the ideological foundations of white supremacy
(defined as macroaggression) to forms of institutional racism to specific microaggressions.
In another study, butcher paper was used to collect examples from among employees of an
institution of higher education who were attending a workshop on cultural competency (Young,
Anderson, & Stewart, 2015). Exposed during the training to a definition of microaggression and
videotaped scenarios related to race, gender, and language-status microaggressions, small groups
of four to six persons identified three examples of microaggression each. The authors later
analyzed the examples using a modified version of the typology of microassaults, microinsults,
and microinvalidation (Sue et al., 2007). This research shared several similarities with the
production of the compendium presented here. First, in both cases, the contribution of specific
individual participants was not made known to the group as a whole, which reduced potential
harm to participants, given the emotionally charged process of recalling such experiences.
Second, there was an initial exposure to key concepts and definitions related to the nature of
microaggression. Third, there was subsequent coding of the data into a typology for discussion by
the participants. Fourth, the resulting examples were further coded according to a typology
adopted. Notably, Young et al. (2015) reported examples of microaggression regardless of status
as producer, recipient, or observer of microaggression, something called for in the further
research section of the present article.
Pérez Huber and Solorzano (2015a) contributed to the theory of microaggression by juxtaposing
it to critical race theory (Ortiz & Jani, 2010), as has also been done by others (Cappiccie et al.,
2012; Ross-Sheriff, 2012). Consistent with the present compendium, Pérez Huber and Solorzano
(2015a) traced research on examples of microaggression to Friere’s suggestion to name the pain
experienced as part of oppression (Freire, 1970). However, they also stressed how
institutionalized practices such as stop and frisk can produce wholesale microaggressions. Recent
dissertations have also provided an important source of theory, methodological improvements,
in-depth discussion of results, and extensive reviews of theory and literature (Haws, 2014;
Williams, 2015).
Drawing on the theory of intersectionality, Lewis and Neville (2015) explored gendered racist
microaggressions and discussed frameworks for carrying out research when two forms of
oppression may be experienced in the same setting or event: (1) the two compound each other as
a form of double jeopardy, (2) they simply interact as race and gender, and (3) they represent a
special form of oppression that is qualitatively unique. Adopting the latter approach, they used
the terminology of gendered racism, citing Essed (1991). One study on the initiation of
microaggressions concluded that supervisors should take responsibility when they microaggress
on others and that institutions should reduce the hierarchical microaggressions generated when
people are systematically devalued by virtue of their institutional role (Young et al., 2015). This
review suggests the need for theoretical and research attention to the roles of oppression,
dehumanization, and exploitation in producing microaggression, as well attention to the full
range of the experience of microaggression, including initiating, receiving, and observing such
acts.
Theory: Microaggression and the sources of injustice
More attention needs to be paid to the theorization of multiple social structural sources of the
experience of microaggression. One of these is clearly oppression itself. Oppression as a social
group-based phenomenon is well theorized (Cudd, 2006; Marsiglia & Kulis, 2009). Ann Cudd,
who theorized oppression as group based and rooted in coercion, recognized the unique nature of
each form of oppression (Young, 1990) but also theorized common aspects of all forms of
group-based oppression. Cudd reviewed a number of other previous theories of oppression
(Harvey, 1999;O’Connor, 2002; Wertheimer, 1987; Young, 1990) but focused more fully on
several theories (Clatterbaugh, 1996; Frye, 1983), especially Gilbert’s reliance on the concept of
a social group (Gilbert, 1989). Cudd theorized four aspects of oppression that constitute
necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence: (1) a harm condition linked to identifiable
institutionalized practices, (2) consistent and institutionally applied harm to a social group that
would exist even in the absence of the harm condition, (3) a condition of privilege for a social
group that benefits from the institutionalized practice, and (4) the use of coercion in order to
enforce the identified harm associated with the oppression.
Notably, Cudd did not include economic classes as social groups. Cudd considered exploitation
to be conceptually distinct from oppression, given that exploitation varies among specific
economic systems and does not always involve the use of coercion. Exploitation is clearly a
source of injustice, and the present literature recognizes class as a source of microaggression
(Smith & Redington, 2010). However, it is important not to trivialize exploitation by reducing it
to a matter of classism and class chauvinism, since such attitudes are not necessary or sufficient
conditions for exploitation-rooted microaggression.
Oppression
Cudd’s theory of oppression itself helps enrich understanding of the nature of microaggression.
Cudd discussed a number of direct and indirect types of material and psychological oppression,
and she viewed material oppression as the use by one social group of violence or economic
domination (seen as distinct from exploitation per se) to hinder the access of a social group to
resources such as income, wealth, health care, and use of space. However, Cudd’s theorization of
psychological oppression is perhaps most central to the present discussion. For Cudd, oppression
has both direct and indirect effects. Direct psychological forces associated with oppression
produce inequality via the intentional actions of people in a dominant group upon people in a
subordinate group. This often involves the use of degradation, terror, objectification, and
humiliation. As such, Cudd’s theory is consistent with the concept of microassaults involving
intentionally discriminatory actions and behavior (Sue et al., 2007).
Theory of microaggressions recognizes the roles of both intentional and unintentional verbal and
nonverbal acts (Sue et al., 2007). This is consistent with Cudd’s theory of the direct and indirect
psychological forces which produce inequality. Such forces constrain decisions made by
oppressed people and can also produce internalized oppression, an observation consistent with
the various psychological dilemmas facing both oppressor and oppressed (Sue et al., 2007). Cudd
identified objective and subjective aspects of direct and indirect oppression. Subjective
oppression involves conscious awareness of how one’s membership in a social group has
resulted in unjust and systematic harm, while objective oppression can take place independent of
awareness. The principle that hierarchies of oppression are not useful (Collins, 1993) is
consistent with theoretical openness to the possibility that microaggressions originate not only in
oppression but in other sources of injustice as well.
Exploitation
Cudd concluded that there is a qualitative distinction between oppression and exploitation. First,
exploitation is not inherently coercive. This observation is enhanced by important insights into
the nature of exploitation offered by the political economist Robin Hahnel (2006). Hahnel noted
that exploitation can be found in voluntary exchanges based on unequal possession of resources
influencing the negotiation of the terms of the exchange. This theorization of exploitation is
applicable across varying economic systems.
Second, Cudd found that exploitation is not group-based, which was one of her criteria for
oppression. According to the present theorization, microaggression stemming from exploitation
is not produced by virtue of whether one is a member of a social group of employers or a social
group of employees. Nor is it a function of whether someone is a member of a group of sellers of
goods and services as opposed to a group of buyers of goods and services. The microaggression
comes from the enforcement of exploitation itself at the level of the interaction between those
with superordinate responsibility for the microenforcement of exploitation and those being
exploited. This can take place in a myriad of forms of economic exchange, irrespective of the
social group membership of the person overseeing the exploitation and the exploited individuals.
In oppression, the member of the dominant group engages in an act of microaggression that
contributes to their privileged social group position as a member of a superordinate social group.
In exploitation, the person engaged in microenforcement does not necessarily benefit individually
from the exploitation. Acts of microaggression associated with exploitation stem from the
microenforcement of exploitation: day-to-day acts by individual agents whose assigned or
assumed role is the supervision and subordination of people whose labor is used in a wide range
of familial, organizational, and institutional environments or whose goods and services are
exchanged from the standpoint of significantly unequal resources.
Dehumanization and implications of the typology
The process of dehumanization can also give rise to moments of microaggression. Haslam’s
theory of dehumanization made an important distinction between animalistic dehumanization
(which is consistent with Cudd’s theory of oppression) and mechanistic dehumanization, which
is distinct from both exploitation and oppression (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).
Animalistic dehumanization involves one social group treating another social group as having
significantly different attributes and is often accompanied by applying animalistic characteristics
to the other group. Animalistic dehumanization is often found in intergroup relations. These
include relationships based on ethnicity, sexual orientation, race, disability status, gender, and
other forms of group domination that are typically reinforced by social structures. The dominant
social group often harbors or expresses emotions such as contempt and disgust for the members
of the other social group. Animalistic dehumanization is here considered oppression, as theorized
by Cudd (2006). This type of oppression is already included in the theories of microaggression
reviewed earlier in this article.
Mechanistic dehumanization characterizes established organizational, institutionalized social
environments that treat human beings as not possessing the core features of human nature.
Dehumanized human beings are treated as automata, not as animals. Mechanistic
dehumanization is characterized by the application to human beings of “standardization,
instrumental efficiency, impersonal technique, causal determinism, and enforced passivity”
(Haslam, 2006, p. 260), similar to the kind theorized by Szasz (1970). Montagu and Matson
(1983) tied dehumanization to industrialization, compulsive obedience, mechanized behavior,
and the impact of the scientific revolution, producing technological dehumanization, or the
reduction of human beings to machines. These theories of biomedical, technological, and
mechanistic dehumanization are not consistent with Cudd’s theory of oppression or Hahnel’s
theory of exploitation. This suggests that in addition to oppression and exploitation,
dehumanization is a third significant source of moments of microaggression.
These three social systems of injustice operate in ways that overlap at the levels of their
enforcing social mechanisms and individual expression. People producing microaggressions may
simultaneously engage in oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation. People receiving
microaggressions may experience them as arising from any aspect of oppression or any element
of ODE, consistent with research on gendered racial microaggression (Lewis & Neville, 2015).
Method and compendium of words and affective phrases
The moment is an important unit of analysis. Practice decisions in professional helping are often
made in moments in which something is said or not said, done or not done, based on what is
thought or not thought, perceived in others or not perceived in others, understood or not
understood. In a single, often identifiable moment, feelings are experienced, often memorably. In
The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life (Stern, 2004), child psychiatrist Daniel
Stern discussed the moment of an intersubjective dyadic or group experience, during which
professionals and clients reunderstand themselves, their present relationship, and past moments
in each of their personal and professional lives. Much can happen in a moment that is positive,
but microaggressions research has given voice to people who point out that “you could find a
thousand offenses in any moment of the day” (Sue, Capodilupo, & Holder, 2008, p. 332).
The unit of analysis of the moment of aggression is not well developed in microaggression
research. It is here defined as the smallest unit of analysis where a clearly discernable act of
microaggression takes place. The subjective reaction to such an act may be instantaneous or
delayed in nature, as is suggested by the words and affective phrases presented here. The
theoretical typology of three sources of injustice (oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation)
presented here arose initially not from a process of formal theory construction but from the
necessity for an inclusive approach to involving students in effective learning about the nature of
oppression. Although this typology has now been applied to a more formal partial theory of
social injustice integrated with extant theory of human need (Dover, 2016a; Dover, 2016b), its
origins in the classroom were serendipitous. This theory can help answer an important question
arising from the literature on microaggressions (Sue et al., 2007, p. 277): “Herein lies a major
dilemma. How does one prove that a microaggression has occurred?” Words and affective
phrases such as those presented below also help address the following methodological problem
(Sue et al., 2007, p. 279): “What is lacking is research that points to adaptive ways of handling
microaggressions by people of color and suggestions of how to increase the awareness and
sensitivity of Whites to microaggressions so that they accept responsibility for their behaviors.”
Sue has also asked the following question (2010a, p. 74): “From the moment a microaggression
presents itself, what internal psychological mechanisms are activated?” Arguably, those
mechanisms are activated with the production of an initial response that can be expressed with an
affective word or phrase, such as those following in List 1 below. The cumulative compendium is
excerpted here in order to begin the process of answering Sue’s question and to provide examples
of the subjective experience of “direct psychological forces of oppression,” such as those
emanating from the experience of terror, humiliation, degradation or objectification (Cudd, 2006,
p. 175).
The use of lists of affective words and phrases was pioneered in a widely used textbook
(Hepworth & Larsen, 1990; Hepworth et al., 2013). The partial compendium below is based on
classroom exercises done from 1990 to 2007. Although classroom exercises have continued
periodically since that time, no words collected at the author’s current university are used here.
This article received an exemption from the Institutional Review Board at the author’s university.
The words and affective phrases below were written by students on 3×5 cards that were handed
in to the instructor, sorted anonymously, recirculated to the class, and slowly and respectfully
read to the class. Further details of the exercise itself were published earlier (Dover, 2008). The
words are in the body of the text (and not in a table or appendix) to give voice to the experience
of the oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation they represent. Space does not permit the
full presentation of List 1, with more than 300 different words and affective phrases.
Presented in List 1 first are the words and affective phrases considered by the participants to be
core emotions produced at the moment of acts of oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation.
Included are those words and affective phrases beginning with all five English vowels and those
beginning with each third English consonant:
abandoned, abused, accused, affronted, agony, alienated, alone, always wrong, as if I
didn’t exist, as if I didn’t matter, attacked, battered, beat up, beaten down, behind, being
left behind, being used, beleaguered, belittled, berated, betrayed, blamed, blocked, booted
out, bound, boxed, boxed in, bridled, broke, broken, burdened, emasculated, emptiness,
empty, enslaved, estranged, excluded, expected to be different, expected to be difficult,
expected to fail, expendable, exploited, exposed, faceless, failed by the system, failure,
fake, feel like a number, feel like an idiot, feel like dirt, flim-flammed, foiled, forced,
forced to do what told, forsaken, frightened, fucked, futile, I have no purpose, I just take
up space, I’m not worth their time, identified by age, ignored, immobilized, impeded,
imprisoned, in slavery, inconsequential, inhibited, inhuman, injured, insecure,
insignificant, insulted, interrupted, intimidated, invalidated, invisible, isolated, jerked
around, judged, judged as an object, junked, just another number, made to feel
unimportant, made small, maltreated, managed, manipulated, marginal, marked,
marginalized, mastered, meaningless, minimized, mislead, mistreated, misunderstood,
misused, monitored, my adulthood was disregarded, objectified, obsolete, obstructed,
oppressed, ostracized, out of place, out of control, outcast, outdone, overburdened,
overcome, overlooked, overpowered, overprotected, overwhelmed, overworked, ranked
always as second best, raped, ready to give up, reduced, regulated, rejected, restrained,
restricted, ridiculed, ruled, unacknowledged, unappreciated, uncared for or about,
under-appreciated, underclass, underestimated, underpaid, underrated, undervalued,
unequal, unfair, unfulfilled, unimportant, unintelligent, unjustified, unrecognized, unsafe,
untruthful, unwanted, used, useless, treated like a thief, vanquished, victimized, viewed
as a child, violated, vulnerable.
This list gives an idea of the enormity of the experience of what this article contends is the
retrospective memory of an act of microaggression.
Classroom discussion of the words and phrases generated concluded that some of the words did
not represent core emotions experienced at the initial moment of ODE. Rather, they were how
people felt seconds, minutes, hours, or days after those initial immediate feelings. These words
and affective phrases were classified as reactive emotions. They help answer the short-term part
of the question posed by Sue (2010a, p. 74): “What short-term and long-term consequences do
microaggressions have on recipients?” The same sampling criteria reduced 94 items to 44 items
in List 2: 
afraid, agitated, analyzed, anger, angry, annoyed, antagonized, anxiety, anxious, ashamed,
baffled, bummed out, embarrassed, emergency, empathy, enclosed, endangered, envy,
fear, fearful, feeling like shit, fight or flight, fragile, frightened, frustrated, frustration,
furious, in danger, in shock, infuriated, injured, injustice, jealous, nervous, offended,
on-edge, outraged, ready to attack, rage, resentful, unloved, unsure, upset, voiceless. 
Over time, the compendium came to include words and phrases that classroom discussion
concluded weren’t amenable to coding either as core emotions or reactive emotions. These words
and affective phrases excerpted in List 3 and List 4 were seen as related to feelings and states that
evolved over a longer period of time, in reaction to cumulative and repetitive experiences of core
emotions and reactive emotions. These we coded as adaptive (List 3) and maladaptive (List 4)
evolved responses to oppression. These two lists help answer the long-term part of the question
posed above as well as an additional question of the same authors (Sue, 2010a, p. 74): “How do
marginalized groups cope in the face of these assaults and are some coping mechanisms more
adaptive than others?”
With respect to evolved adaptive responses, sensitivity to oppression and feelings of solidarity
with the oppressed, exploited and dehumanized were evident in 48 evolved adaptive responses in
List 3 (with no sampling used):
accepting of sexual orientation, anti-authoritarian, anti-racist, anti-sexist consciousness, assertive,
came to look at positives, consciousness, class conscious, creative, determined, differently abled,
dignified, dissatisfied,
empowered, enduring, feminist, full of righteous indignation, fed up with the system,
hopeful, humanized, humble, inadequate, inspiration, internationalist, mad as hell won’t
take it anymore, militant, modest, motivated, nationalist, oppositional, organized,
outspoken, persevering, persisting, prayed for, proud, rebellious, resourceful,
self-respecting, sensitivity to oppression, sisterhood, solidarity, spiritual, they’re
connected!, together, union, united, unpretentious, we’re tight
List 4 (also with no sampling used) presents some emotions or emotional states that can be seen
as maladaptive evolved responses:
actor, aggressive, apathetic, apologetic, ashamed, assumed role, bitter, conquered,
damaged, dead, defeated, depressed, destruction of identity, diminished self-worth,
disillusioned, displacement, distrustful attitudes, drained, dutiful woman, exhausted,
flattened, full of despair, helpless, hidden, hopeless, ignorant, incompetent, inferior,
institutionalized, irrational, irrelevant, lethargic, like a robot, like an actress, never good
enough, no self-worth, not good enough, phony, pitiful, powerless, unpurposeful
The coding of these words and affective phrases into core emotions, reactive emotions, and
adaptive and maladaptive evolved responses is not validated in any way by social psychological
research. The compendium and typology were developed for heuristic and pedagogical purposes.
No claim is made that the compendium has any formal reliability or validity. However, the
compendium and the typologies of sources of injustice that arose from them are one example of
class theory: theory arising from the classroom. They may also be seen as one example of the
craft of theorizing (Swedberg, 2014), a process which is often only understood retrospectively
(Dover, 2010).
Limitations of the work presented
It is important to discuss a number of limitations in the approach taken by this article. First, the
material presented here was not social research but ideas generated in a classroom exercise. The
compendium summarized here cannot be considered a reliable database of the range of feelings
produced at the moment of microaggression. Second, the words were collected as self-described
feelings associated with the experience of an act of oppression, dehumanization, or exploitation,
not as feelings associated with the moment of microaggression. However, with respect to both of
these limitations, since the first publication of the compendium (Dover, 2008), subsequent use of
the exercise at the author’s present university has shown that it is now rare for new words and
affective phrases to be generated in List 1. Another limitation is that more attention was given to
collecting words for List 1, rather than to List 2 (reactive emotions). Lists 3 and 4 are also very
undeveloped but serve to complete a typology of four kinds of words and affective phrases
emanating from the exercise. They are presented here for theoretical purposes and may have
research implications. Third, participants were not asked to identify the nature of the experience
itself, such as whether the words were generated by oppression, dehumanization or exploitation
or some combination of them. Fourth, most of the words generated in Lists 2, 3, and 4 were
generated very early on in the development of the compendium. Fifth, no effort was made to
document the nature of the interaction producing the remembered words and affective phrases.
No vignettes were collected to place the words in context. Actual research with full human
subject protection could collect vignettes that provide more context to these words. This would
also permit collection of demographic data on the persons involved in the interaction and their
membership in various social groups, if known. Sixth, the words and affective phrases were
collected only in English. Finally, a solid definition of oppression, dehumanization, and
exploitation was not finalized until the publication of the important works on which the present
theoretical typology is based (Cudd, 2006; Hahnel, 2006; Haslam, 2006). This meant that there
was variation over time in the nature of the definitions to which participants were exposed.
Further research
This section discusses the potential for future research stemming from the theoretical and
empirical material presented in this article. First, given the contention that microaggression is
produced by oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation, rather than by various forms of
oppression alone, future research should fully explore the varied causal paths associated with the
experience of microaggression. Second, given the multiple social roles most people engage in,
including our multiple social group memberships, more attention needs to be paid to the way in
which individuals both initiate and receive acts of microaggression. Third, as this suggests, the
experience of microaggression is a mutual one, at various levels of realization at that moment
and immediately after. This requires further research. Fourth, research on microaggression would
benefit from more random surveys within universities, workplaces, and elsewhere.
Fifth, vignettes of the initiation and receipt of microaggression should be collected (Basford,
Offermann, & Behrend, 2014). Sixth, such research should avoid using terms such as perpetrator
of microaggression and the commission of microaggression, because it evokes the language of
criminalization. Seventh, research should incorporate improved measures of the frequency and
longevity of experience of microaggression, something important to the conceptualization of
cumulative advantage and disadvantage (Du Bois, 1935) and the cumulative nature of
microaggression (Pérez Huber & Solorzano, 2015a; Sue, 2010a). Eighth, research should more
fully appreciate the experience of microaggression rooted in membership in more than one
oppressed social group (Lewis & Neville, 2015). Ninth, research should appreciate the distinct
empirical possibility that there is variation in the severity of the psychosocial outcome of acts of
microaggression. With all due respect to not creating hierarchies of oppression (Collins,
1993)—a principle important to building unity within struggles against social injustice—failure
to expand microaggression research to general populations would trivialize the experience of
microaggression by oppressed populations if it did not seek to understand the question of severity
of impact, measured in terms of frequency and longevity and in ways to be determined.
Tenth, future research would benefit from exposing research participants to a simple paragraph
length rendition of each of the three sources of injustice presented here. Participants would also
be asked to choose which source(s) of injustice were seen as most closely related to the events in
the experiential vignette they shared. Researchers could also themselves code the vignettes
without being privy to the participant’s evaluation. In these ways, progress could be made toward
a better understanding of the nature of social injustice and the myriad acts associated with
microaggression. Finally, because microaggressions impair effective human relationships, future
research should draw upon self-determination theory, a psychological theory of human needs for
relatedness, competence, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000), as well as a compatible theory of
human need that stresses the significance of human relationships for achieving health and
autonomy needs (Doyal & Gough, 1991; Gough, 2015).
Conclusion
One of the author’s instructors, the late Paul Byers of Columbia University Teacher’s College
(Byers, 1977), called for research on human relations that uses an epistemological perspective to
understand the significance of results for social theory. He distinguished between findings that
stress what people do and those that help us think about who people are. This distinction between
does and is, between doing and being, is not a trivial one. Byers felt that research should help us
expand the horizons of our research domain.
At the time Byers wrote, Chester Pierce was already suggesting that microaggressions were an
important aspect of human communication. Since that time, microaggression research has
addressed nearly every recognized form of social oppression. Byers’s work, as well as the theory
and compendium presented here, suggest that research on microaggression should attend to the
full range of human emotions experienced in connection with the everyday experience of
moments of oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation. After all, when research related to the
experience of oppression is done using data collected at the individual level, it can and should
still be analyzed at the unit of analysis of the structures that have an effect on individuals (Fine,
2006; Opotow, 2002; cited by Fine, 2006). In this article, three such structures have been
suggested: the social systems of oppression, dehumanization, and exploitation.
Not all knowledge development takes the form of published formal research and/or theory. This
article was based upon classroom exercises (Dover, 2008), and one article reviewed was rooted
in a training exercise (Young et al., 2015). Although such exercises do not represent formal
experiments, they can generate theory and professional understanding of the nature of
microaggressions.
Also, practitioners can contribute to knowledge development about microaggressions through the
use of process recordings in the evaluation of practice. Nearly all helping professionals and client
populations have multiple memberships in social groups that influence our human interactions in
many capacities, including participation in social groups that are both dominant and subordinate
and participation from the standpoint of various social positions within cultural, organizational,
and institutional environments. Recognition of within-group and between-group similarities and
differences in the experience of microaggression and the diversity of social positions suggests an
expanded use of the collection of words and affective phrases as part of research on the nature of
microaggression.
This recognition can also inform the evaluation of practice. By examining the unit of analysis of
the practice decision, defined as something said or not said, done or not done at a particular
moment, helping professionals can learn to avoid producing microaggressions in our work with
clients and communities. Process recordings can also serve as the basis for writing narratives of
practice for publication in interdisciplinary journals such as Reflections: Narratives of
Professional Helping.
One tradition in the literature on microaggressions has been a first-person account of the
experience of microaggression (Sue et al., 2007). Rarely, however, has an author provided an
account of the commission of a microaggression. In one published account of the present
author’s practice, there were certainly examples of microaggression (Dover, 2009), including the
time I abruptly shut off the radio at a group home, only to later realize how I had failed to
understand the depth of the oppression faced by the residents. None of us are immune from the
production of microaggression, few of us are free of its experience, and we are all positioned to
observe and respond to such acts. Using process recordings to remember and document how one
felt (or didn’t feel), what one said (or didn’t say), and did (or didn’t do) within a professional or
other human interaction is perhaps the best way to systematically understand, learn to avoid, and
learn how to respond to microaggressions that are initiated, received, or observed. Increased
attention by field instructors, students, educators, practitioners and researchers to
microaggressions, and to the sources of the injustice that produce them, can contribute to practice
and activism geared toward achieving social justice for clients and communities.
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